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THE INVISIBLE INTERPRETER
Johannes Bronkhorst, Université de Lausanne
Abstract 1
This article argues that the interpreter of foreign Cultures should avoid falling into the trap of 
“domesticating” those Cultures more than is strictly necessary. Understanding a foreign Culture is 
situating its beliefs, customs etc. in their context, not in the context of the modern Western world. 
To think, for example, that classical India was populated by linguists, philosophers, and others like 
us is mistaken and misinterprets Indian Culture. The paper concludes with a general reflection on 
the relationship between individual culture and the Culture shared by many people, for example in 
a geographical region.
Indologists are not the only ones whose task consists, at least in part, in inter-
preting texts of a past Culture for a readership that has no or little acquaintance 
with that Culture. Like translators, they have to address the question whether and 
to what extent they are called upon to “domesticate” the foreign Culture. Must 
indologists try to present foreign material in a manner that it seems, to the extent 
possible, familiar to their modern readers? Or is it their task to show the 
“foreignness” of that material, emphasizing the different contextual factors that 
play a role, and the hidden presuppositions?
I assume that these are questions that all those who seriously study foreign 
Cultures have to face, and for which most of them have explicit or implicit 
answers. Authors wish to be understood. In order to accomplish that goal they 
must have an idea of who their readers will be and what these readers can easily 
understand. Too much contextual information will discourage the uninitiated.
And yet the danger is obvious. Historians have long been aware of the risks 
of what they sometimes call “Whiggish history”, the approach to history that 
sees an inevitable progression toward present circumstances. This approach can 
colour political history, but not only that. The history of science easily takes the 
form of a description of the various steps that supposedly lead to our present 
1 This paper was read at the Fourth International Conference “Oriental Languages in Trans-
lation and Interpretation”, Institute of Oriental Philology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, 
18–20 October 2010.
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scientific knowledge. The same applies to other disciplines, such as philosophy, 
or linguistics. Applied to the Indian situation, this means that we interpret the 
early Indian texts on science, or philosophy, or linguistics, as more or less 
successful attempts to get to the point where these disciplines are today. In 
theory methodically conscious indologists may feel critical about this approach, 
in practice it is the approach that many of them adopt.
Take Yāska’s Nirukta, a text dealing with the etymologies of Vedic words. 
This text was discovered by modern scholarship in the nineteenth century, when 
Indo-European historical linguistics attracted much attention. Yāska’s etymolo-
gies were assimilated to the etymologies of historical linguistics, almost as a 
matter of course. It took scholarship a long time to fully realize that Yāska’s 
Nirukta and modern historical linguistics were doing altogether different things, 
and that Yāska’s etymologies could not be judged by the yardstick of Indo-
European studies. To find this out, Yāska’s text had to be studied in its own 
context. Since we now know that the Nirukta has nothing to do with historical 
linguists, scholarly interest in it has dwindled.
Consider next the grammar of Pāṇini. It gained tremendously in apprecia-
tion when modern linguistics took a form that shared features with this ancient 
work. From relative disrespect in the 19th century (William Dwight Whitney’s 
negative opinion about Pāṇini is often cited) it became “one of the greatest 
monuments of human intelligence” in the nineteen thirties (Bloomfield, 1933: 
11). It goes without saying that it was the shared features that received, and still 
receive, all the praise. There is nothing wrong with this, except that Pāṇini’s 
grammar has other features, too, that do not fit in so easily with modern linguis-
tics. These other features receive a lot less attention.
To these observations about the modern study of Indian linguistics it is easy 
to add others about the modern study of Indian philosophy. There are aspects of 
Indian philosophy that are not dissimilar to what modern philosophers study. It 
will be clear that these are the aspects that receive almost all the attention in 
modern scholarship. It is equally clear that there are other aspects of Indian 
philosophy that receive almost none. And yet, the neglected aspects are often the 
ones without which Indian philosophy cannot be understood in its own right.
It is not necessary to limit this discussion to topics that are more or less 
close to modern academic disciplines. Much the same could be said about reli-
gious practices, such as those collectively referred to as Yoga. Yoga has become 
a household name in the modern world, but not because its main purpose –
liberation from the cycle of rebirth – has been adopted by modern practitioners 
of Yoga; it has not. The uses of Yoga in the modern world attract a great deal of 
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attention nowadays, but it would be a major mistake to project these modern 
uses back onto the ancient Indian yogis.
For those who do not aspire to understanding Indian linguistics or Indian 
philosophy in its own right, or to reaching liberation from the cycle of rebirths, 
those other aspects – the ones that have no parallels in or significance for 
modern linguistics and philosophy, or for maintaining health – are without 
interest.2 It is the good right of these researchers to stick to the things they like. 
However, it would be inappropriate to call them scholars of Indian Culture. I 
assume that many of them would agree, for they often aspire to jobs in depart-
ments of linguistics, or philosophy, or to healthy and successful lives. They use 
the Indian material as a source of inspiration to be used for something that has in 
itself nothing to do with Indian Culture. They use it the way the chemist August 
Kekulé used his dream of a snake seizing its own tail to discover the ring shape 
of the benzene molecule.3 Kekulé was a chemist, not a dream specialist. The fact 
that he drew inspiration from a dream did not turn him into a dream specialist. 
Those who use Indian materials to make progress in their own respective fields 
find themselves in a similar situation: they are linguists, or philosophers, or 
whatever else, but not interpreters of Indian Culture.
I hope that it is clear what I am driving at. The linguist who convinces his 
readers that Pāṇini was a linguist like himself, the philosopher who describes the 
ideas of Indian thinkers exclusively in terms of the philosophy now taught at 
universities and who may engage in what is sometimes called “fusion philo-
sophy”, both of them domesticate the Indian material to the extent that one may 
wonder what is Indian about it. And indeed, I would argue that these people are 
in danger of providing partial, if not completely incorrect knowledge about 
Indian Culture.
So what? Why should anyone care that the image presented of Indian lin-
guistics, or of Indian philosophy, or indeed of Indian science or anything else 
Indian, is no more than a distorted reflection of the real thing? Why shouldn’t we 
tap other Cultures, including Indian Culture, for ideas that may be of interest to 
us? In my opinion there is nothing wrong with that, on condition that we know 
2 Silk (2009: 3) states: “I think it is obvious that we are primarily interested in learning about 
the past for what it can tell us about ourselves. This is why certain things about the past 
interest us more than others, and why what may appear to us as most significant may not 
have seemed so to those whose lives and ideas we study.” Perhaps so. But it should not 
exclude that we have an interest in what may have seemed most significant to those whose 
lives and ideas we study.
3 For further examples from chemistry, see Farber, 1966.
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what we are doing. The moment we believe that ancient and classical India were 
really populated by linguists, philosophers, scientists and others like us, at that 
moment we lose sight of the richness and variety of human Cultures, even with 
regard to those Cultures that have left us ample testimonies to show the opposite.
There is another extreme, the complete opposite of the domestication of 
foreign Cultures, viz., cultural relativism.4 This is the position according to 
which the cognitive gap between Cultures is too wide to be bridged. This posi-
tion, if correct, would show up all those who try to interpret foreign Cultures as 
wasting their time. Ernest Gellner (1992: 52) had some interesting things to say 
about the attraction of cultural relativism to Americans:
Americans, to this day, [are] inclined to absolutize their own culture, and to equate it with 
the human condition as such, and hence unconsciously to treat other cultures as perversions 
of the rightful human condition. Individualism, egalitarianism, freedom, sustained innova-
tion – these traits are, in the comparative context of world history, unusual, not to say 
eccentric; but to Americans they are part of the air they breathe, and most of them have 
never experienced any other moral atmosphere. […] No wonder that Americans tend to treat 
these principles as universal and inherent in the human condition. […] It is this which gives 
the hermeneutic message its exciting flavour in America; when Middle America at long last 
grasps the message, it is liable to find it novel and intoxicating, in its total inversion of old 
habits of thought.
Gellner adds that outside America the appeal of relativism cannot but be less (p. 
52–53):
There are parts of the world – e.g. Levantine ports – where every street peddler is at home in 
a number of languages, and is familiar with the idiosyncrasies of a number of cultures; in 
such an audience, the relativist message could only produce a yawn.
Gellner may or may not be right in thinking that relativism has most appeal to 
Americans. Whatever the truth in this matter, it will be clear that the belief that 
the gap between Cultures is so profound that it cannot be bridged is the opposite 
extreme of the total domestication discussed earlier. And it is an extreme that 
would force into early retirement all those who consider it their task to interpret 
other Cultures.
The task of those who study other Cultures, then, is to show that the truth 
lies in between these two extremes. The linguists, philosophers, and others I 
have talked about so far run the risk of creating an image that is close to the 
4 For a critique of cognitive relativism, see, e.g., Sokal, 2008.
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former extreme: people in other Cultures are, or were, in all essentials like us; 
they did pretty much the same as what we do, even though they were perhaps 
dressed differently and ate their steak with a different sauce (or not at all). Inter-
estingly and paradoxically, these linguists, philosophers etc. may feel close to 
the latter extreme, that of relativism, thinking that the gap between Cultures is 
really unbridgeable; the best we can do in that case is make our pick and use bits 
of it for our purposes, for any deeper understanding is impossible.
I repeat that the task of seriously studying other Cultures is to avoid these 
extremes. We can understand Indian linguists, philosophers or scientists on their 
own terms, but this requires extra effort. This extra effort consists in situating the 
Indian ideas in their context rather than ours. This in its turn means that inter-
preters of another Culture – whether they are indologists, sinologists, or some-
thing else – have to make themselves visible and explain that an understanding 
of this additional material is necessary, that without it a distorted image arises of 
the Culture concerned.
It is possible to give some more depth to this discussion by delving a bit into the 
question what is culture. We can take as point of departure a dictionary defini-
tion, such as the following: “The totality of socially transmitted behavior pat-
terns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of human work and 
thought.” For our present purposes we may leave material products out of con-
sideration.
Culture, as I see it, is borne by individuals, even though I admit, as I must, 
that these individuals interact with others. Many individuals may bear individual 
cultures that are similar; in such cases it becomes possible to speak of, say, 
Indian Culture, the Culture of the Bushmen, etc. But ultimately culture is some-
thing that belongs to individuals, and only metaphorically to groups of people.
I know that not everyone will agree with this position. Certain scholars 
rather attribute intersubjective reality to culture, and deny, or at any rate play 
down, its connection with individuals. I’ll quote a passage from Jeppe Sinding 
Jensen’s book The Study of Religion in a New Key (2003), which bases its view 
of religion on the “linguistic turn” in philosophy. What it says about religion 
might equally be applied, some would say, to culture in general (p. 421):
Just as linguistic grammars are normative, idealized descriptions of speakers’ behaviour, so 
is the description of any one religion as a system of action and thought: we should not 
mistake the description for that which it describes. The fact that I may describe Roman 
religion at some level of generality does not involve the claim that such a thing ever was in 
any particular Roman’s mind, but only that if I were to study Roman religious represent-
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tations, then the description of that purported ‘system’ would help me make sense of the 
representations in question.
Jensen admits “the fact that individual minds are needed to process any social 
material” but thinks that this “does not invalidate the social and symbolic point 
of view” (p. 418–419). He refers to Terrence Deacon’s book The Symbolic 
Species (1997) in support of “the importance of the social and symbolic inter-
action in human evolution” (p. 419), and concludes: “[…] there is plenty of 
religion not only in believers’ minds but similarly in the ‘space-time’ worlds of 
discursive systems and ideologies as social and cultural constructs.” He fears 
that we may “see the study of religion ‘swing’ back to the individualist per-
spective before a more thorough examination of the consequences of the ‘lin-
guistic turn’ has even been undertaken” (p. 420).
As it so happens, I, too, have been influenced by Deacon’s book in my 
understanding of culture and religion. I have argued at some length that the best 
way to come to grips with culture and religion is through an understanding of the 
use by human beings of ‘symbols’ (in the Peircian sense in which Deacon uses 
it) and of language. It is true that ‘symbols’ and language cannot exist without 
social interaction. I have not, however, felt the need to postulate the existence of 
non-reducible social collectivities and social properties, as Jensen seems to do. 
Without such non-reducible social collectivities and social properties, we have to 
situate religion, and culture in general, in individual human beings, even though 
we have to be aware of the unique and complex ways in which these individual
human beings interact. Much of the complexity of this interaction is due pre-
cisely to the ‘symbols’ and languages used, which have not been invented by an 
individual and which the individual acquires from his or her social surroundings.
Culture, then, belongs to individuals, and can be thought of as a web of 
signs, or even as an accumulation of webs of signs, both linguistic and non-
linguistic.5 No parts of this web can be removed without destroying it.
This way of representing individual culture has the advantage of both 
showing its social origin and at the same time that there is no way to fully pass it 
on from one individual to another: each person has his or her own web, created 
by innumerable individual experiences that we do not share with anyone else. 
Strictly speaking, therefore, individual cultures are unsharable, and the gaps be-
tween them cannot be fully bridged. Recognizing the individual anchorage of 
5 Bronkhorst, 2010: 180 ff. Cp. Donald, 2001: xiv: “[…] on a deeper level, any given culture 
is a gigantic cognitive web, defining and constraining the parameters of memory, know-
ledge, and thought in its members, both as individuals and as a group.”
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culture prevents us from theorizing that cultures are, in the end, independent of 
individuals.
This prepares us for a discussion of Cultures with a big C. If we consider 
that such Cultures, say classical Indian Culture or modern Western Culture, are, 
so to say, constituted of innumerable cultures with a small c, the conclusion is 
obvious that full communication between cultures is impossible. This is true for 
individual cultures, even of people who are members of the same family, and all 
the more for Cultures with a capital C. There is no way for a modern scholar 
from Europe to get under the skin of an Indian who lived two thousand years 
ago. But neither can he get under the skin of people with whom he grew up and 
shares his life. There is here a difference of scale, not of principle.6 In both 
cases, enough can yet be communicated to make the effort worthwhile. The 
requirement in both cases is to convey as much context as is feasible. Don’t tear 
the web more than is necessary by taking elements out of their context. There are 
obvious limits to this procedure (one can never provide the full context of any 
element), but the more one provides, the better one will succeed in conveying 
the distinguishing features of a Culture.
Let us consider a concrete yet non-technical example: the belief in rebirth 
and karmic retribution. It is easy to take this belief out of its Indian context and 
discuss its merits and demerits. One may even adopt this belief without being 
interested in Indian Culture. Indeed, one may believe that scientific evidence 
supports it, in which case Indian Culture does not enter into the picture at all. In 
this last case, no help from a professional indologist is required to learn more 
about it.
However, if one wishes to understand the belief in rebirth and karmic retri-
bution as it existed in Indian Culture, it becomes necessary to provide contextual 
elements. In that case it is important to specify that all religious and intellectual 
currents that accepted this belief had as highest aim to put an end to rebirth, and 
were willing to go to incredible lengths to bring this about. There are other con-
textual factors that would have to be mentioned, such as the circumstance that 
for a long time the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution was not accompanied 
by a belief in a God who oversees the process; this notion came later. In fact, the 
more one is able to situate the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution in its 
Indian context, the closer we come to an understanding of this belief as it was 
held by Indians. In practice, there is a limit to the amount of context one can pro-
6 This is not to deny that there can be discontinuities between Cultures, just as there are be-
tween languages and between religions.
42 JOHANNES BRONKHORST
AS/EA LXV•1•2011, S. 35–43
vide, for reasons of time and space, but also because of the limited information 
provided by our sources. The general rule should however be clear: the more 
contextual information we provide, the less we domesticate the foreign culture 
by adapting it to our own.7
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